Human sociality as a new interdisciplinary field by Enfield, N.J. & Levinson, S.C.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/42936
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-06 and may be subject to
change.
Introduction: Human Sociality as a 
New Interdisciplinary Field
N.J. Enfield and Stephen C. Levinson
At the heart of the uniquely human way of life is our peculiarly intense, mentally mediated, and highly structured way of interacting with one another. This rests on participation in a common mental world, a 
world in which we have detailed expectations about each other's behavior, 
beliefs about what we share and do not share in the way of knowledge, 
intentions, and motivations. That itself relies both on communication 
(linguistic and otherwise) and on a level of cooperation unique in the 
animal world. This mode of cooperative, mentally mediated interaction 
enables the accumulation of cultural capital and historical emergence 
of cultures. By inheriting a world of social organizations and values, 
individuals are released from reinventing the wheel. In turn, cultural 
capital shapes the style of interaction in local social groups, hiding 
shared commonalities behind the veil of distinct languages, cultural 
styles, and forms of social organization.
This, at least, is the thesis of this book. It brings together anthropologists, 
linguists, psychologists, and sociologists whose work has not been 
juxtaposed before. When we put the pieces of the jigsaw together, 
what emerges is a new map of a still underexplored terrain—the roots or 
foundations of human sociality.1 We propose that this is a new scientific 
domain, a coherent subject for investigation constituted by intersecting 
principles of different orders (ethological, psychological, sociological, 
and cultural) that work together to produce an emergent system, a 
system of human sociality and social interaction.
In this introductory chapter, we want to give readers a sense of how 
the rest of the chapters fit together to form an outline of this domain.
1
2 Introduction
We first sketch some contributing research traditions and the ways they 
fit together. We go on to delineate the different phenomena that are the 
focus of the individual chapters, drawing attention to the connections 
that run through them. Finally, we sketch our own synthesis of the 
domain.
The ideas in this book ramify and connect with one another in 
multiple ways. Although no linear order of chapters could capture such 
a network of connections, our division of the book into five parts aims 
to emphasize certain linking themes. Part 1 consists of four chapters 
focusing on central properties of face-to-face interaction, the arena in 
which human sociality is centrally exercised. Part 2 focuses on psycho­
logical foundations of human sociality, exploring the question of just 
what it takes to pull off human interaction as we know it. Part 3 deals 
with issues of culture and cultural difference, and the ways sociocultural 
forces may play a role in structuring interaction and interactional 
expectations, and vice versa. Part 4 explores ways in which cognition 
is defined by its being exercised in social interaction, and how the 
social exercising of cognition has effects both on our understanding of 
the individual's psychology (part 2) and of the higher levels of social 
organization and broader cultural conventions (part 3). Part 5 features 
phylogenetic perspectives, with two chapters asking how key features 
of the human system for interaction could have evolved and a third 
chapter comparing human social abilities with those of the other great 
apes.
Distinctive Properties of Human Sociality
The focus of this book is the distinctive nature of human sociality, the 
character of the social interaction that underpins social life. We do not 
mean its mere complexity. Many animals, not just humans, have complex 
social lives. Ants, for example, have hierarchies, complex divisions of 
labor, advanced fungal agriculture, communication, organized transport, 
colonization, and warfare. In this chemical society, the essential glue that 
holds the vast ant communities together is pheromonal. Our inquiry 
into the roots of human sociality asks about the nature of the special 
kinds of social bonds that set humans apart. Our brand of sociality 
distinguishes us even from our nearest relatives, the apes. We perhaps 
share with the apes some basic social principles: flexible coalitions, out­
marriage, short-lived hierarchies. But these few commonalities are not 
going to explain the divergences: human advanced agriculture, elaborate 
communication systems, organized transport, planned colonization or
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warfare, to mention a few antlike properties. Above all, the primate 
background does not explain the extraordinary cultural variety of 
human social organization, communication, and lifestyle. The entire 
enterprise of ethnographic research has been dedicated to understanding 
this diversity, and the rich details of cultural worlds that individuals 
inhabit. Less attention, certainly by anthropologists, has been paid to 
understanding the commonalities, the shared foundations in human 
cognition, motivation, instinct and social interaction that make these 
variations possible. Here, we know much less because standard social 
inquiry trades on these commonalities (e.g., in participant-observation) 
without examining them, being prompted mostly by the discovery of 
difference. But there is a hidden raft of commonality that makes the 
expression of difference possible in the first place.
Supported by uniquely human abilities, and responsive to context- 
specific motivations and accumulated cultural conventions, human 
social interaction exhibits striking properties not found elsewhere in 
the animal world. It involves frequent, intense, and highly structured 
interaction, using complex communication systems, on which the rest 
of culture depends for its realization. Robust parallels across cultures 
in the organization of everyday talk suggest an ethological foundation 
to human interaction. But above all what makes human interaction 
qualitatively distinct in the animal kingdom is that it is built on inter­
subjectivity, enabling a brand of joint action that is truly open-ended 
in goals and structure. This provides the building blocks for human 
cultural diversity.
Uniquely human phenomena such as cooperation, commensality, 
morality, and the inhibitions that underlie it, prolonged dependence of 
offspring, capacity for intention attribution, planned deception, and the 
highly structured nature of social interaction form an interdependent 
network. The researcher maybe positioned at any point on this network 
and see human sociality as branching from that point. One might 
say, for example, that cooperation is the key: It is cooperation that 
makes morality essential; allows collective investment in offspring; 
and lies behind the sheer interest in social interaction, the special 
communicative abilities, and the cultural shaping of shared lifestyle. 
Other starting points are possible. Different authors in this book start 
from different corners of this network (see also Kockelman 2005), but, 
crucially, they agree that human social life is intricately structured 
through the attribution of actions, motives, intentions, and beliefs to 
fellow interactants. (They do not always agree, however, as to the best 
analysis of how such attribution is achieved; see below.)
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Contributing Research Traditions
Ideas presented in this book relate historically to a number of major 
strands of research that have hitherto remained largely unconnected. 
One of our motivations as conveners of this project was to bring different 
traditions together, and allow a common focus on the foundations of 
human interaction to emerge. We outline four domains: Theory of 
Mind (ToM), Gricean pragmatics, the analysis of talk and action in 
interaction, and related developments in anthropology.
ToM and the Psychology o f  Human Interaction
In developmental psychology, a keen research interest has arisen in 
the human ability to attribute knowledge, intentions and beliefs to 
other humans, and to monitor these attributed inner states, using such 
ongoing models to interpret actions and events.2 Some developmental 
disorders such as autism can be understood as a failure to achieve this 
level of understanding (Baron-Cohen 1995).
The development of an understanding of other minds in human 
children takes a partly puzzling course. A comprehensive understanding 
of others' inner states, and especially that others might have false beliefs, 
develops at around four years of age, surprisingly late in childhood (see 
Astington for discussion and references). By comparison, normal infants' 
mental mastery of the material world (naive physics) seems complete 
by even one year of age, and the fundamental grammatical structures 
of a language are well in place by three at the latest. Some theorists 
suggest that children gradually have to construct a fully articulated set 
of psychological skills for modeling and reasoning about others' internal 
states—that is, what others might want, think, feel, and know (or not 
know, as the case may be). This set of skills is known as ToM (in the 
sense of an actor's "theory," not of an analyst's).
An apparently difficult and particularly late-developing component 
of ToM is the ability to attribute false belief. For example, a child in 
the course of development learns that whereas he or she knows that 
chocolate in a chocolate box has been replaced by pencils, others may 
nevertheless expect there to be chocolate there. Children under the 
age of four do not show evidence of being capable of attributing false 
beliefs like this. (These false-belief tasks are sometimes taken to define 
ToM in a strict sense.3)
But here is the puzzle. It seems on first principles that without beliefs 
about what others do or do not know one could not be a competent 
interactant. How would you know what to tell me or what would require
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pointing out? How and why would you even begin communicating 
if you had no developed concept of other minds? From age one and 
even earlier, children show much evidence of taking other's beliefs and 
intentions into account. Their development rests on it (see Gergely 
and Csibra, Liszkowski, Tomasello). That children of 12 months use 
pointing gestures to inform—for example, telling an adult the location 
of something the adult is looking for—shows that they have the ability 
not only to produce action oriented to another's mental state (e.g., 
someone not knowing where something is) but to presuppose that the 
action (e.g., a pointing gesture) will be recognized by another as having a 
communicative intention. There is much already in place by age one.
Clearly, then, ToM is a matter of incremental mastery. Among the 
issues this volume struggles with are what the components of a ToM 
must be, what the incremental stages are, and at what point down 
that incremental hierarchy we share elements of ToM with our nearest 
cousins among primates. Judging from ape behavior, it seems harder to 
understand beliefs than desires Judging from human infants, it is harder 
to understand second-order beliefs (John thinks that Mary believes 
the chocolate is in the box) than first-order ones (Mary believes the 
chocolate is in the box). Does effective joint action—a possible precursor 
to culture—presuppose ToM? Is language crucial for discovering the full 
potential of a ToM? Are there culture-specific practices that encourage, 
or constrain, its development in childhood? With a better grasp of 
these components, the stages by which they develop, and the ways 
they are deployed in daily life, we may better understand both human 
ontogeny and phylogeny.
Gricean Pragmatics
A second line of work guiding the debates in this book originates in 
philosophy, specifically in H. P. Grice's (1957) idea that meaning is 
grounded in the recognition of intention. Seeing you fall over ahead 
of me up a steep path, I am relieved to see you get up and wave in 
my direction, taking your wave as designed to make me think you are 
OK. The wave works because you have correctly calculated that I will 
recognize the plan behind your action, namely getting me to recognize 
that you intend me to think you are OK. In this example, the wave has 
a nonce or one-off meaning recoverable against a background of your 
figuring what I would figure when I see it.
Grice's idea is important because it shows meaning, in a broad sense, 
to be independent of language or convention. This points to possible 
precursors to conventional meaning, in ontogeny, diachrony, and,
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perhaps, phylogeny. On this account, meaning is not a property of 
signs or symbols, but a property of minds in (mediated) interaction 
with other minds. Conventional meanings can be thought of as arising 
from repeated use of what were once novel signals. If I fall down and 
likewise wave, we might set up a miniconvention that then spreads 
through the community of hikers.
Another important aspect of this psychologizing of meaning is that it 
allows us to analyze the unspoken communicative contents associated 
with conventional symbols. For conventional meanings never exhaust 
the import of what is said. The simplest utterance usually carries with 
it a penumbra of intended but unspoken thoughts. (Consider What are 
you doing tonight? which is likely to be forecasting an invitation, not 
simply asking a question.)
The whole business of exchanging intentions in communication relies 
on background assumptions that help to narrow the range of intention 
attribution. Grice (1975) suggested that the essential background 
assumption by which interactants constrain and guide their inferences 
about speaker intentions is a principle of cooperation. (The principle, 
comprising maxims of quality, quantity, relevance, and manner, has 
since been updated in modern recastings such as Levinson 2000 and 
Sperber and Wilson 1986.) Recipients of others' signals work on the 
assumption that such signals have been designed specifically for them 
to extract the intended meaning. In turn, senders of such signals design 
those signals in such a way as to take into account such an expectation of 
targeted design on the part of hearers. By a principle of audience design 
(or "recipient design"; Sacks and Schegloff 1979), any utterance should 
have been formulated by a speaker with the intention that it cause just 
the right effect in the receiver, taking into account the common ground 
of the particular combination of speaker and addressee(s). For example, 
in telling you something about my colleague John, I will first refer to 
him in a way appropriate to your knowledge of him—for example, as 
John if we commonly know him as John, but as, say, a colleague o f  mine 
if I suppose you have never met him (Enfield and Stivers in press).
In sum, Gricean principles require the modeling of others' inner 
states, and thus presuppose a ToM. They also entail a stock of common 
ground, readily provided by culture (e.g., that How do you do? is not 
seeking information, that it is OK to strip down on the beach but not 
on the street, or that sweet desserts come after savory main courses; 
Enfield 2000; Levinson 1995). E. Goody (1995) suggests that the entire 
structure of social roles in a society should be understood against this 
background, providing systematic constraints on appropriate social 
intentions and their ascription.
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Microanalysis o f  Social Interaction
Detailed study of the systematics of social interaction in its own right was 
initiated by a string of 20th-century mavericks including G. Bateson, R. 
Birdwhistell, H. Garfinkel, and E. Goffman. The study of the systematics 
of social interaction has since passed largely to conversation analysts 
and other students of talk and action in interaction, with research 
resulting in a detailed inventory of observed interactional practices and 
patterns.4 Most of these practices can be characterized as sequences of 
interlocking social actions (e.g., turns at talk) whose interpretations are 
associated with specific (sometimes culture-specific) expectations and 
preferences. The taking of turns at talk, the openings and closings of 
conversations, the structure of request sequences, practices for correcting 
or repairing utterances, and so on, have been carefully explored in 
English-language conversation. There is also an increasing knowledge of 
how these things work in other languages. Emerging from this research 
are candidate universals for the organization of human interaction 
(see Schegloff), such as the mechanism for transition of turns at talk 
in informal conversation, and the ways in which interlocutors correct 
and repair their own and others' utterances—a crucial mechanism for 
maintaining intersubjectivity. There is a strong expectation that such 
structures should be universal, given that they are essential for preserving 
order and agreement in moment by moment social experience. (See 
Goffman 1981:14, for a list of such "system requirements and system 
constraints," including "framing capabilities," Gricean principles, and 
"nonparticipant constraints.")
Conversation analysts try to avoid the psychological turn that character­
izes ToM research and Gricean pragmatics. They prefer to talk in terms of 
actions as recognizable through the details of their observable structure 
and their specific placement in sequences of action. But they are equally 
interested in intersubjectivity, the way in which a shared understanding 
is arrived at. Hence the special interest in "intercalibrative" mechanisms 
like repair and audience design.5
Related Developments in Anthropology
Biological anthropology has entertained various solutions to its central 
puzzle of the evolution of human cognition and language, conceived 
in terms of causal adaptational pressures (e.g., Dunbar et al. 1999; 
Richerson and Boyd 2004). Most if not all of these hypotheses have an 
interactional flavor. Primatologists and comparative psychologists have 
tried to pinpoint exactly what properties humans share with their nearest
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primate relatives, and they have tried to probe to what extent deception, 
and more generally ToM capabilities, extend across the higher primates 
(Byrne and Whiten 1988; Sussman and Chapman 2004; Tomasello et al. 
2005; Whiten and Byrne 1997) Ju st as the ability for planned deception 
has been seen as a defining Rubicon in human evolution, so imitation 
has been seen as an important threshold for the possibility of acquiring 
culture. The cooperative nature of human interaction raises fundamental 
evolutionary puzzles (Boyd and Richerson 2005, this volume; Henrich et 
al. 2004). Cooperative instincts are unlikely to evolve and persist under 
natural selection, which means there must be higher-level checks on 
good intentions, a calculus of motives pushing a spiraling cognitive arms 
race into an intensely intentional world. The complexity of the social 
world that resulted may have become a selecting environment that put 
further pressures on cognitive development and interactional skills.
In sociocultural anthropology, as in the social sciences generally, 
the interactional foundations of social life have not been a central 
focus of research. Indeed, the key method of participant-observation 
presupposes the transparency of the interactional medium through 
which research is done, like the entomologist who uses the microscope 
as a tool rather than analyzing it. We trade on our "common humanity" 
to do anthropological research, yet typically without documenting or 
analyzing the mediating interactional interface. But if we ask how 
interaction itself works as a system, and how through the specifics 
of social interaction we can come to learn the things we know—both 
as analysts and as participants—important empirical questions arise. 
To what extent is the unexamined interactional system a constant 
across sociocultural space and time? To what extent is cultural context 
constructed by modulating specific interactional parameters? To what 
extent can differences in the conduct of social interaction affect cognitive 
or cultural categories?
Despite a relative neglect of the details of face-to-face interaction 
in mainstream sociocultural anthropology, our theme has numerous 
points of contact with several vital strands of ethnographic research. 
Work examining cultural conceptions of the person as agent and 
actor suggests that in some traditional societies there is an ideological 
reluctance to attribute thoughts and intentions to others (Shore 
1998). (However, work on divination and religion proposes that these 
practices have bases in our interactional, intention-attributing instincts: 
Boyer 1994, 2002; Goody 1995; Zeitlyn 1995.) Different ideologies of 
intersubjectivity may be related to child-rearing practices, as explored in 
literature on language socialization (see Gaskins; Schieffelin and Ochs
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1986). A succession of frameworks has arisen from within linguistic 
anthropology for thinking about constraints on verbal interaction in 
(culture-)specific settings (Duranti 2001; Gumperz and Hymes 1986; 
Hymes 1964), and about the invocation of such frames on the fly 
through "contextualization cues" (Gumperz 1982). This wider cultural 
context is captured in Geertz's notion of "thick description" (Geertz 
1973), tying the ideological and historical particularities of culture to 
the conduct of everyday life. Not unrelated in spirit is an important 
cross-fertilization between ethnographic research and the microanalysis 
of interaction (e.g., Goffman 1963, 1964, 1974; Goodwin 1994, 2000; 
Sidnell 2001, 2005), which connects through to the new "cognitive 
ethnography" traditions that examine distributed cognition, the idea 
that social institutions work through a cognitive division of labor 
organized in situated interpersonal interaction (Hutchins 1995).
Notwithstanding these glimpses of insight from within social and 
linguistic anthropology—many of which are drawn on in the chapters 
of this book—the foundational nature of social interaction, in all its 
detail, is yet to be properly recognized in the larger compass of social 
anthropology.
Human Interaction as the Focus of a New 
Interdisciplinary Field
One aim of this book is to define and consolidate a new field of research, 
a multidisciplinary approach to human interaction, its organization, 
and its constitutive role in social life. The project asserts the centrality 
of social interaction in the organization of human societies. Research 
in multiple disciplines shows just how intricately organized human 
interaction is, using multimodal channels of communication, building 
on detailed presumptions and shared understandings, foreseeing courses 
of action, and attuning to cultural settings. Underlying all this is a 
specialized cognition, crucially involving intention attribution or "mind 
reading" and the accumulation of shared understandings that makes 
historical culture possible.
From the chapters of this book, there emerges a set of closely interlocked 
concepts and lines of enquiry, which we sketch in Fig. 1.1.
In the diagram, the boxes represent some of the crucial concepts 
in the discussion. The arrows show the links emphasized by different 
authors in this book. The diagram can stand as a mnemonic for the 
complex arguments adduced throughout the book, demonstrating 
interconnections between what at first seem rather different areas
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7. Multimodal communication
Schegloff * 8. Interaction 
procedures
2. Group 
selection
6. Common ground P eS H  Cultural practices
i ___- ____ ______ ___________ _____________________
------- * Cumulative cultureBoyd & Richerson
Figure 1.1 . Interlocking concepts developed in the different chapters. ToM = 
Theory of Mind.
of research. The density of connections indexes a clear domain of 
integrated inquiry.
To see this, let us take a single question, and follow where it leads us 
through the network of ideas and the chapters that make up this book. 
How did our unique brand of sociality evolve, with its varied linguistic 
and cultural environments? If we start with cooperation (box 1), we 
land in the thick of it. As discussed in the Boyd and Richerson chapter, 
the origin of cooperation is a deep puzzle in evolutionary theory. If this 
was social, a sort of enforced amity or Hobbesian contract, the answer 
might lie outside a theory of biological evolution. Yet the chapters by 
Gergely and Csibra, Tomasello, and Liszkowski each report very early 
cooperative acts by infants, suggesting the existence of cooperative 
instincts. Boyd and Richerson argue that this can only be accounted for 
by group selection (box 2). But this would rest on abilities to emulate
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and imitate, the learning basis for building groupwide behavioral 
patterns (box 3). Byrne shows, observing gorillas, that these cognitive 
preconditions for cultural learning can have simple roots in behavior 
parsing. Gergely shows that human infants further analyze actions for 
their means-ends rationality, and will imitate "irrational" arbitrary (and 
thus potentially cultural) actions only when rational analysis fails. This 
presupposes the central ability to attribute intentions, or "mind read" 
(Theory of Mind, box 4). As a number of the chapters show, elements 
of ToM appear early enough in human development to suggest an 
instinctual basis. ToM abilities underlie joint action (box 5, see Clark), 
resting in part on cooperative instincts. Joint action must have been a 
crucial factor in the increased fitness of the group, which would have 
incrementally established biological foundations for ToM. Once our 
ancestors had developed some ToM, they would have had a basis for 
designing communicative actions in just such a way as to get others to 
recognize their intentions (Gricean intentions, box 4). This would then 
provide foundations for a rich kind of communication system without 
parallel in the animal world (see Levinson). These Gricean intentions 
rely for their recognition on keeping track of shared experience and 
knowledge (box 6), as discussed by Enfield. The exploitation of common 
ground depends on public signaling and display, which can exploit all 
the expressive modalities (box 7; see Goldin-Meadow), and indeed the 
props provided by the environment (see Goodwin, Hutchins). Even 
simple output systems can have rich interpretations, as demonstrated 
by Goodwin. This predicts that languagelike communication can arise 
without the provision of a conventional language, and this is what 
indeed happens in "home-sign" systems (see Goldin-Meadow). Once 
our ancestors had evolved a languagelike system of any advanced 
complexity, it would by a feedback relation have greatly amplified the 
power of ToM (see Astington, Pyers).
So far, we have considered a set of interlocked properties that the 
human individual brings to the task of conducting social interaction, 
which plausibly evolved together. But these properties are deployed in 
a highly structured system of interaction (box 8), with its rapid turn 
transitions, repair systems, overall sequential structure, and so forth 
(see Schegloff). These seem to have a universal, cross-cultural base, 
and are thus equally characteristic of human sociality. In fact, there 
are multiple connections between the interaction system and ToM. 
For example, the rapid turn-taking system and the repair system are 
the major guarantors of shared subjective understandings (Schegloff 
1992). When what I say reveals a misunderstanding of what you
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said, you get an immediate opportunity to correct it. An interaction 
system based on shared understandings provides an environment for 
distributed cognition (box 9), that is, for the distribution of cognitive 
labor that underlies effective joint action, as described by Hutchins. Such 
a system has emergent properties, shifting the burden of explanation 
away from properties of the individual to the shared activity. We can 
"read" other minds in part because human interaction is organized so 
as to engender intersubjective understanding. This fits the evolutionary 
theory sketched by Boyd and Richerson: We can only have evolved 
cooperative instincts in an environment in which joint action could 
endow a group with selective advantages.
Those selective advantages rest on the rapid adaptability of groups to 
circumstance. This entails cultural diversity (box 10). Social interaction 
has a distinctly different flavor across cultures, with the central media 
of communication—human languages—showing striking variation. 
Cultural learning in ontogeny (box 11), with its foundations in imita­
tion (box 3), allows the accumulation of specific cultural practice, 
building the common ground that makes shared subjectivity possible. 
Cultural diversity in ideology and practice may feed back into local 
specializations of ToM and interaction practice (see Danziger, Gaskins, 
Hanks, and Pyers, in particular). Cultural systems are subject to their 
own evolutionary mechanisms (see Sperber) and to rapid change and 
adaptation (see Keating), allowing social groups to respond rapidly to 
new opportunities or challenges. This brings us full circle, back to the 
group selection that could have favored cooperative instincts in the 
first place.
What this exercise shows is that we will not obtain a good grasp of 
the evolutionary background to our species, and the unique properties 
of our social life, without understanding the links between these diverse 
aspects of our psychological and behavioral makeup. They form a web of 
interconnected properties that together constitute human sociality.
The Logic of this Book and its Organization
The chapters of this book explore human sociality from a range of 
disciplinary perspectives. As the previous section will have made clear, 
this means that organizing them into a linear order is a challenge. Our 
aim in this section is to outline our solution (one of many possible), 
and to weave the threads into a structured whole.
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Part 1: Properties o f  Human Interaction
The most directly accessible manifestation of human sociality is face-to- 
face interaction, unfolding in real time, in conversation or some other 
type of sustained copresent engagement. What are its properties? The 
chapters in part 1 deal with the organization of interaction, touching 
on issues of copresence and engagement, sequence and intersubjectivity, 
and coordination and commitment.
An Interaction Engine (Levinson) Levinson begins with a bird's-eye view of 
human behavior, arguing for a universal base to the species-specific way 
in which humans interact with one another. The underlying principles 
governing human interaction appear to be independent of specific 
languages or specific cultures. Indeed, they continue to operate where 
there is no shared language and culture. The language independence 
of these interaction principles, along with their facilitatory effect on 
language, suggests a phylogenetic priority of interaction principles over 
language in the history of the species.
What are these interaction principles? Levinson suggests that one 
can think of humans as being endowed with an interaction engine, con­
sisting of a raft of motivations, cooperative tendencies, multimodal 
communication systems, and psychological endowments. A crucial 
ingredient is the mental equipment for Gricean communication—that 
is, the ability to recognize intentions based on signals whose formulation 
has been designed such that just those intentions be recognized. This 
motivates many of the properties of interaction, including the turn- 
taking machinery of verbal interaction, which effectively requires 
understandings to be immediately tested and displayed. Despite this 
universal base, interaction patterns can vary dramatically across cultures, 
as every traveler knows. Indeed, they must do so, because they are the 
carriers of culture. So how then does one reconcile these differences 
with a rich universal basis to interactional behavior? Levinson explores 
cross-cultural differences in the naming of persons, for example, 
under taboo restrictions, and shows how local cultural constraints can 
interact with universal principles (Enfield and Stivers, in press). The 
suggestion is that much cultural variation can be accounted for in terms 
of tweaking the interaction engine and the generic principles governing 
social interaction. The overall idea then is not that the interaction 
engine produces cross-cultural uniformity but that it provides generic 
constructional principles on which cultural diversity may be built, in 
human interaction.
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Generic Problems and Their Generic Solutions (Schegloff) Schegloff's 
chapter picks up on this theme, focusing on the strikingly flexible yet 
precise organization of the sequential structures of human interaction. 
Schegloff reviews a set of candidate generic solutions to the basic 
problems of coordination and intersubjectivity in social interaction. 
For example, everywhere in the world, as far as we know, informal 
talk in conversation is organized using a precise and rapid turn-taking 
system; it is subject to repair or correction in similar ways; it exhibits 
paired utterances like questions and answers; it has recognizable 
openings and closings. Rapid alternation of turns at talking allows 
misunderstandings to become clear, and the turn-taking system is so 
organized as to allow them to be dealt with as near as possible to where 
they occur. A conversational repair system acts as the main guarantor 
of intersubjective understanding (Schegloff 1992; Schegloff et al. 1977), 
playing a crucial role in any kind of human interaction, regardless of the 
semiotic system employed. Generic interaction mechanisms of the kind 
reviewed by Schegloff are what make interaction without conventional 
language possible, as in the home-sign systems described in Goldin- 
Meadow's and Levinson's chapters, or the interaction with an aphasic 
man described in Goodwin's chapter.
The Local Richness o f  Social Interaction (Goodwin) Goodwin draws 
attention to the semiotically rich environment of human sociality, 
the intensive mutual copresence definitive of social interaction as we 
know it. Interactants provide and access information simultaneously 
from a great array of sources, including lexical items, grammatical 
constructions, prosody, deployment of gaze, facial expression, bodily 
comportment, and hand gesture. Even the "imperfections" of natural 
speech such as "errors" and their repair carry important information, 
and may be strategically managed. For example, a speaker may break off 
his or her own speech before completion to secure the visual attention 
(i.e., eye gaze) of another. The types of linguistic break-offs and restarts 
that result (and that pepper normal speech) have the effect of making 
explicit their internal syntactic structure, potentially providing an 
account for syntactic learning (cf. the discussion of action parsing in 
Byrne's chapter).
By Goodwin's account, an individual's production of talk and action 
is an intrinsically public, collaborative process. His case study of inter­
action with Chil, a severely aphasic man, draws into stark relief the 
kind of collaborative meaning making that is going on all the time in 
"normal" conversation. Chil's communication problems are overcome
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in collaboration with his interlocutors, via common exploitation of 
semiotic resources in the immediate environment. (These "resources" 
include the other people in the interaction.) Despite having only three 
words and some use of gesture, Chil is able to engage successfully in social 
interaction. Again, as with home-sign systems used by deaf children 
(see Goldin-Meadow, Levinson), the human interactive system affords 
collaborative construction of meaning with very slender resources.
Collaboration and Commitment (Clark) Clark argues that the sort of 
focused, sustained interaction described by Levinson, Schegloff, and 
Goodwin presupposes individuals' commitment to the interaction as 
a collaborative activity. This is the kind of social commitment that 
makes it difficult to get off the telephone without first getting into (and 
through!) a closing sequence. Any kind of joint action requires mutual 
commitment, and has to be coordinated in some way Consider the 
simple coordination of action involved in moving a table together. You 
have to pick up one end, and I the other, at more or less the same time, 
then I must move a bit, and you too, relating my speed to your speed. 
We have to know where we are going, and mutually monitor potential 
hazards like steps, and so on. Clark proposes that the commitments 
required to succeed in joint action are hierarchically organized, and that 
minor commitments (like "let's lift the table now") are subordinate to 
higher-level ones (like "let's get the table into the living room"). As his 
review of the extraordinary Milgram Experiments demonstrates, making 
a higher-level social commitment entails lower-level commitments 
we might not have foreseen. This is because committing to the larger 
activity means committing to its subcomponents. In turn, refusing 
to commit to subcomponents can mean reneging on one's existing 
commitment to the entire activity. This leads us into the powerful 
emotional and moral dimensions of social life.
Part 2: Psychological Foundations
The organization of social interaction and the commitments it entails 
presuppose special psychological underpinnings. The ability to recognize 
others' states of mind, whether attentional or volitional, and to share 
these states of mind through mutual focus in the ongoing course of 
interaction, is indispensable for human sociality. Chapters in the second 
part focus on the nature and development of the psychological basis 
for social interaction.
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Generic Problems and Their Generic Solutions (Schegloff) Schegloffs 
chapter picks up on this theme, focusing on the strikingly flexible yet 
precise organization of the sequential structures of human interaction. 
Schegloff reviews a set of candidate generic solutions to the basic 
problems of coordination and intersubjectivity in social interaction. 
For example, everywhere in the world, as far as we know, informal 
talk in conversation is organized using a precise and rapid turn-taking 
system; it is subject to repair or correction in similar ways; it exhibits 
paired utterances like questions and answers; it has recognizable 
openings and closings. Rapid alternation of turns at talking allows 
misunderstandings to become clear, and the turn-taking system is so 
organized as to allow them to be dealt with as near as possible to where 
they occur. A conversational repair system acts as the main guarantor 
of intersubjective understanding (Schegloff 1992; Schegloff et al. 1977), 
playing a crucial role in any kind of human interaction, regardless of the 
semiotic system employed. Generic interaction mechanisms of the kind 
reviewed by Schegloff are what make interaction without conventional 
language possible, as in the home-sign systems described in Goldin- 
Meadow's and Levinson's chapters, or the interaction with an aphasic 
man described in Goodwin's chapter.
The Local Richness o f  Social Interaction (Goodwin) Goodwin draws 
attention to the semiotically rich environment of human sociality, 
the intensive mutual copresence definitive of social interaction as we 
know it. Interactants provide and access information simultaneously 
from a great array of sources, including lexical items, grammatical 
constructions, prosody, deployment of gaze, facial expression, bodily 
comportment, and hand gesture. Even the "imperfections" of natural 
speech such as "errors" and their repair carry important information, 
and may be strategically managed. For example, a speaker may break off 
his or her own speech before completion to secure the visual attention 
(i.e., eye gaze) of another. The types of linguistic break-offs and restarts 
that result (and that pepper normal speech) have the effect of making 
explicit their internal syntactic structure, potentially providing an 
account for syntactic learning (cf. the discussion of action parsing in 
Byrne's chapter).
By Goodwin's account, an individual's production of talk and action 
is an intrinsically public, collaborative process. His case study of inter­
action with Chil, a severely aphasic man, draws into stark relief the 
kind of collaborative meaning making that is going on all the time in 
"normal" conversation. Chil's communication problems are overcome
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in collaboration with his interlocutors, via common exploitation of 
semiotic resources in the immediate environment. (These "resources" 
include the other people in the interaction.) Despite having only three 
words and some use of gesture, Chil is able to engage successfully in social 
interaction. Again, as with home-sign systems used by deaf children 
(see Goldin-Meadow, Levinson), the human interactive system affords 
collaborative construction of meaning with very slender resources.
Collaboration and Commitment (Clark) Clark argues that the sort of 
focused, sustained interaction described by Levinson, Schegloff, and 
Goodwin presupposes individuals' commitment to the interaction as 
a collaborative activity. This is the kind of social commitment that 
makes it difficult to get off the telephone without first getting into (and 
through!) a closing sequence. Any kind of joint action requires mutual 
commitment, and has to be coordinated in some way. Consider the 
simple coordination of action involved in moving a table together. You 
have to pick up one end, and I the other, at more or less the same time, 
then I must move a bit, and you too, relating my speed to your speed. 
We have to know where we are going, and mutually monitor potential 
hazards like steps, and so on. Clark proposes that the commitments 
required to succeed in joint action are hierarchically organized, and that 
minor commitments (like "let's lift the table now") are subordinate to 
higher-level ones (like "let's get the table into the living room"). As his 
review of the extraordinary Milgram Experiments demonstrates, making 
a higher-level social commitment entails lower-level commitments 
we might not have foreseen. This is because committing to the larger 
activity means committing to its subcomponents. In turn, refusing 
to commit to subcomponents can mean reneging on one's existing 
commitment to the entire activity. This leads us into the powerful 
emotional and moral dimensions of social life.
Part 2: Psychological Foundations
The organization of social interaction and the commitments it entails 
presuppose special psychological underpinnings. The ability to recognize 
others' states of mind, whether attentional or volitional, and to share 
these states of mind through mutual focus in the ongoing course of 
interaction, is indispensable for human sociality. Chapters in the second 
part focus on the nature and development of the psychological basis 
for social interaction.
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Pointing, 1—The Ontogenetic Kernel o f  Human Sociality (Liszkowski) 
Liszkowski reports on a series of experiments designed to explore 
the bases of infant pointing (see also Tomasello). As in the chapters 
by Goodwin, Levinson, and Goldin-Meadow, this gives us a sense of 
how social interaction can work without (full) language capacities. 
Prelinguistic infants make pointing gestures, but it has been unclear 
whether they are doing languagelike communication with this, as 
opposed to, say, spontaneously expressing their internal response to 
an object or event, or simply trying to get attention. Liszkowski gives 
evidence that 12-month-old infants point to communicate, taking into 
account other's goals and apparent knowledge states. If an experimenter 
appears to be looking for something he had a moment ago, but which 
has now gone out of his view, a one-year-old infant will point to it 
as a way of telling the adult where it is. Further, if the experimenter 
misunderstands an infant's pointing gesture, the infant will try again. 
This is a spectacular finding, because ToM literature standardly suggests 
that the ability crucial to this account (i.e., knowing that the other does 
not know something) is a much later achievement in development, 
coming not at 12 months but at four years. In Liszkowski's studies, 
the child is clearly using pointing for informing, one of the main 
motivations for communication. The children in these experiments 
are not only informing the adult experimenters but helping them. This 
is suggestive of early cooperative instincts (see Boyd and Richerson, 
Tomasello), particularly as the helping uses of pointing are employed 
here in interaction with people other than a main caretaker.
ToM, 1—The Suite o f  Capacities and the Role o f  Language (Astington) The 
phenomenon of pointing takes us more centrally to how "mind reading" 
may work. The foundations here are (1) having a grasp that others have 
mental states and (2) recognizing that these may diverge from one's own. 
This must involve an awareness of one's own kinds of mental states, 
and arguably the ability to employ such mental states in explaining 
the actions of others. Astington's chapter reviews what is known about 
children's development of such a ToM. A number of researchers (see 
Gergely and Csibra, Liszkowski, Tomasello) believe that human infants 
first grasp the nature of the other as an intentional agent from about 
nine months. But it is also widely accepted that a fully comprehensive 
ToM, as indicated by false belief understanding, is slow to mature, 
coming significantly after the full essentials of language are in place. 
Astington argues that language plays a key role. She reviews three ways 
in which this has been proposed in existing literature: knowledge and
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use of mental state verbs with meanings like "want/' "think," "know," 
and "believe"; knowledge and use of the complex syntactic structures 
associated with these mental state predicates; and firsthand experience 
of face-to-face conversation.
ToM, 2—Consequences o f  Language Deficit (Pyers) Pyers's chapter narrows 
in more closely on the relation between language and ToM, with a case 
study of a Nicaraguan sign-language community. Pyers's research reveals 
startling evidence for the crucial role that language may play in acquiring 
ToM capacities. In Nicaragua, a substantial Deaf population was only 
in the last decades brought together into a socially networked speech 
community, thanks to the establishment of educational institutions for 
the Deaf. This has led to the growth of a new natural language known 
as Nicaraguan Sign Language, a Creole born of many smaller home- 
sign or village-sign systems. The first generation of signers learned what 
was effectively a pidgin with limited expressive power. In addition, 
they were late learners of language in any form. By contrast, younger 
signers of the following generation have had the benefit of exposure 
to a developed sign language from a young age. Pyers reports that tests 
for ToM capacities show the younger signers to have a significant edge. 
The older signers do not master standard false belief tasks. This is prima 
facie evidence that language plays a determining role in the acquisition 
and application of ToM.
Imitation and Rational Learning (Gergely and Csibra) A developmental 
perspective on the question of how we read intentions into the actions 
of others is pursued by Gergely and Csibra. They investigate human 
infants' imitation of adults' actions, finding that infants do not just 
copy actions, but analyze the goal directness of others' behavior and 
look for the rationale behind the means chosen for carrying out an 
action, doing selective imitation accordingly. Thus, if a woman with 
her hands tied turns on a light with her head, an infant imitating this 
action will turn on the light with his or her hand (Gergely et al. 2002). 
This imitation achieves the same goal (getting the light to go on), but 
does not reproduce the means. The child surmises that the adult would 
have used her hands if she could have: that is, given that her hands were 
full, the woman's unusual action of using her head is rational. But in 
a different experimental condition, in which the adult has hands free 
and yet turns on the light using her head, the infant will use his or her 
head as well in imitating this. In this case, the woman could have used 
her hands to do the action, but does not. The child extracts a different
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rationale for the marked manner of action, surmising that it was this 
unusual manner that was intended (i.e., here the adult chooses to use 
the head and not the hands), thus being a defining and not merely 
contingent part of the action the adult performed.
The possibility for rational learning of this kind is critical for the 
acquisition of culture. Cultural actions have both rational means-ends 
aspects (like collecting food and preparing it to eat) and nonrational, 
culturally constrained aspects (like eating with a knife and fork rather 
than with the fingers). Our children have to acquire both. In each case, 
the process of acquisition involves intention attribution based on direct 
observation of others' actions (cf. the description of action parsing in 
Byrne, and syntactic parsing in Goodwin). It happens that sometimes 
part of the goal of an action is that the action be done in a specific 
manner. This applies in the case of culturally stylized action.
Part 3: Culture and Sociality
A number of chapters discussed so far touch on culture. In part 1, both 
Schegloff and Goodwin suggest that the nature and details of copresent 
engagement have a direct bearing on the establishment of a common 
worldview of interactants (see also Enfield). Levinson's chapter lays out 
the view that social interaction shapes, and is shaped by, local norms 
and routines. In addition, as Goodwin and Hutchins point out, the 
artifactual environment directly shapes our interactions. The cultural 
shaping of the material world can thereby feed back into the nature and 
organization of sociality. In part 2, Gergely and Csibra deal with one of 
the ways in which such cultural identification is signaled, providing the 
possibility for rational acquisition of locally specific (and "nonrational") 
manners of carrying out practical actions. The conventional manners 
people actually learn are locally defined, and historically emergent. 
Further, in part 5, as previewed below, the cooperative instincts of central 
importance to Boyd and Richerson are linked to a drive to maintain 
social identification with specific social groups, leading ultimately to the 
development of distinct cultures. Selective advantages of being cultural 
beings rest on the rapid adaptability of culture to circumstance, which 
underlies the cultural diversity that characterizes our world.
The four chapters in part 3 explore the relation of culture to human 
sociality, including implications of cultural variation.
Local Ideologies o f  Intention A ttribution (Danziger) Danziger deals frontally 
with a question of cultural ideology in the analysis and interpretation
Introduction 19
of human sociality. Given that notions such as intention attribution 
and ToM have been developed in Western society, to what extent do 
these notions reflect a bias in our own cultural practices? It is not 
known in what way or to what degree ToM has uniform cross-cultural 
relevance. There may be cultures with distinctly different ideas about 
the readability of others' intentions. Danziger explores a reluctance to 
attribute intentions beyond the literal content of what is said among 
the Mopan, a Mayan Indian group of Belize. The Mopan hold that a 
sincere statement that turns out to be false is a "lie," and they do not 
consider to be a "lie" an insincere statement that turns out by accident 
to be true. But they are quite able to pass false-belief tasks. It is not that 
the Mopan lack ToM. Rather, they place cultural limits on the inferences 
one may make from behavior, including speech. Danziger concludes 
that there are profound consequences of Mopan cultural ideology about 
the role of intention in meaning.
Cultural Variation in Caregiver-Child Interaction (Gaskins) Although 
most research on child development is conducted in Western settings, 
there are significant differences across cultures of the world in the ways 
in which caregivers and infants interact. These imply differences in the 
socialization of children into interaction itself. Gaskins points out a 
theoretical tension between two major presumptions in consideration of 
this issue. On the one hand, the essential outcomes of human cognitive 
development are presumed to be universal (see Astington, Tomasello). 
Children everywhere become competent adults. On the other hand, 
the processes that lead to successful socialization are dependent on very 
distinct kinds of input for learning in highly varied cultural settings. 
Gaskins's chapter offers a review and analysis of ethnographic research 
on child-caregiver interaction and socialization, detailing extreme 
variation in how infants are treated across cultures. The Western 
tendency for adult caregivers to try to induce focused interaction, with 
its attendant motherese, peek-a-boo routines and the like, appears to 
be exceptional. In many other cultures adult caregivers attempt to 
forestall needs and thereby preempt interaction. Sustained interaction 
with eye contact is rare. In Western cultures the emphasis is on the 
adult attempting to interpret the child's communications, whereas 
in many other cultures the onus is on the child to understand the 
adult. These striking contrasts raise questions about the universality of 
both the developmental process and its outcomes (see Pyers's evidence 
from Nicaraguan signers). Gaskins argues, however, that no matter 
how dramatic cultural variation appears to be, it must be providing an
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environment in which certain fundamentals of sociality can develop. 
Some concrete possibilities are suggested in chapters exploring the 
early development of cognitive abilities critical to language and social 
intelligence (e.g., Gergely and Csibra, Liszkowski, Tomasello), including 
practices of establishing and maintaining joint attention (e.g., by finger 
pointing), sufficient to impart the ability for shared intentionality.
Integrating Multiple Frames and Participant Roles (Hanks) Socialization 
not only gives rise to general abilities and local retoolings of these but 
it brings a mountain of shared background for organizing and framing 
interaction in culture-specific ways. Culture supplies rich resources for 
participants to frame their engagements, and to adopt culturally relevant 
participant roles. In turn, interlocutors have to be able to recognize the 
specific frames and roles that are relevant to the interaction at hand. 
Further, as Hanks explores in his chapter, there may be multiple such 
frames and roles, as locally specified in a given cultural setting. This 
poses an integration problem for interactants. In addition, in many 
situations, interlocutors have to deal with distinct discrepancies in 
knowledge (or what Hanks dubs uncommon ground). Hanks explores 
these themes with reference to an extended example of shamanic 
curing sessions in Yucatan. These sessions have elaborate structure, 
with phases of conversational exchange between shaman and patient, 
phases of prayer, and phases in which the shaman addresses the divining 
crystals, discerning answers to his queries as if reading the minds of the 
spirits. There is a layering of interchange within interchange (talk to 
the spirits within talk to the patient), as well as a layering of cultural 
institutions. Hanks's chapter raises the challenge that all accounts of 
social interaction need to face: How do we integrate our general "social 
instincts" with specific cultural and often multilayered settings?
Evolution o f  Cultural Convention Through Interaction (Keating) Although 
cultural traditions like Mayan shamanism can be stable over millennia, 
they can also quickly evolve. Keating's chapter describes rapid adaptation 
of a conventional communication system (American Sign Language) to 
the new technology of videophone connections on computer. She shows 
that signers are fast establishing conventions from the new possibilities 
offered by the medium of communication. For example, one can move 
the hands forward for emphasis, placing them close to the camera such 
that they take up more of the visual field. (This would not work in real 
signing space, i.e., during face-to-face interaction.) Similarly, using the 
immediate feedback from the monitor of one's own signing as seen by
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the interlocutor, one can exploit the collapse of the third dimension on 
the screen (e.g., pointing left to empty space so that it looks as if one is 
pointing to someone behind and to the left). Signing is hereby acquiring 
a new genre, with conventions of its own in the making. This case study 
shows rapid exploitation of new affordances offered by a change in the 
technological environment. Keating's observations dovetail with those 
of Goodwin and Hutchins concerning the key role of environmental 
affordances in human communication and cognition. It is this kind of 
potential speed of change in public conventions, compared with the 
glacial pace of genetic change, that gives both culture and the particular 
form of human sociality their adaptive value from an evolutionary 
point of view.
Part 4: Cognition in Interaction
Chapters in part 4 focus on cognition in interaction, and its consequences, 
cross-cutting the key concerns of parts 1-3—the organization of social 
interaction, its psychological underpinnings, and its sociocultural 
context(s). These chapters examine ways in which cognition and 
interaction not only interlock, but how they can be coconstitutive. 
The interactional setting is a primary context for the externalization of 
cognitive processes, where the relevant "cognitive artifacts" (Norman 
1991) may include graphic devices, hand gestures, and the very 
people with whom we are interacting (see Goodwin). Such artifactual 
externalization of cognition can have both local and global effects, with 
consequences for the course of interaction itself, and for what ends 
up being shared among interactants as individuals in ongoing social 
relationships, and as common members of entire cultural systems.
Making Thought Public, Without Language (Goldin-Meadow) Goldin- 
Meadow explores how both symbols and thoughts emerge in interaction. 
First, she describes a striking example of communication working 
without conventional signs or symbols: the case of deaf children who 
are not exposed to a systematic conventional sign language, but instead 
construct a system of manual signs de novo (a so-called home-sign 
system; see Levinson). Sometimes, nondeaf parents of deaf children 
address them using spoken language only. In these cases, the child will 
invent a sign system of his or her own. The system is used one way, 
with the parent talking and gesturing back. These home-sign systems 
have languagelike properties: they show arbitrary form-meaning 
mappings; they are formally categorical; scenarios distant from the
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here and now can be effectively described, and so forth. Such a system 
fundamentally relies on intention attribution (see Astington, Gergely 
and Csibra, Levinson), together with generic mechanisms for solving 
generic problems of communication and intersubjectivity (e.g., repair of 
nonunderstanding; see Goodwin, Schegloff). Goldin-Meadow's research 
shows how a species that had first evolved advanced interactional 
intelligence could, providing some cooperative instincts were in place, 
evolve a languagelike communication system. Here, many of the issues 
dealt with in the present book come together: the multimodality of 
social engagement, commitment and cooperation in social interaction, 
ToM and intention attribution, and emergence of convention.
The second section of Goldin-Meadow's chapter, focussing on 
gestures accompanying speech, shows how these freely inventive signals 
adumbrate "liminal" thoughts, allowing interactants to bring them into 
consciousness. Focusing on teacher-child interactions in arithmetic, in 
which children are still struggling to understand basic operations like 
subtraction, she finds that children unable yet to articulate or execute 
solutions, still betray a partial understanding in their gestures. Teachers 
unconsciously pick up on this inarticulate revelation of dawning 
comprehension, and can build their explanations on it. The hand 
betrays the thought, for gestures are cognitive artifacts (Enfield 2005b; 
see Hutchins), allowing communication in interaction to proceed where 
conventional language fails (as it did with the deaf children).
Online Interaction and the Emergence o f  Structure (Hutchins) Hutchins 
proposes another way in which the interactive system derives greater 
power than its structural components alone can contribute. His argument 
begins from a point emphasized in Goodwin's chapter, that there is a 
great deal of information publicly available in the environment of any 
given interaction. Environmentally coupled social interaction gives rise 
to a higher-level or emergent shared system of cognition. Social systems 
exploit this potentiality by structuring social activities such that they 
will have just these emergent effects. Hutchins argues that standard 
assumptions about the bases of social interaction, including ToM and 
intention attribution, overestimate what the individual brings to the 
task while underestimating what the task brings to the individual. This 
is amply illustrated in Hutchins's well-known example of what it takes 
to navigate a battleship into harbor (Hutchins 1995). As he explicates 
in his chapter, the navigation team on the bridge combine words and 
gestures with a map representing their path and position, so deciding on 
the bearings to use in navigating the massive vessel's course. The rest of
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the calculations are automated as it were through the highly structured 
division of labor of the team and their instruments. Hutchins's point 
is that the entire overarching intelligence of the joint action cannot be 
attributed to any single individual. It is not represented in any single 
place but is emergent in the interactive activity. Hutchins suggests that 
the key to understanding human intelligence (including ToM) and 
its phylogeny (see part 5) is to see that higher-order cognition is first 
instantiated in joint activity. It thereby provides a selective environment 
for cognition about other minds, hence the development of ToM 
abilities.
Building and Exploiting Common Ground (Enfield) The possibility of rich 
interaction given scant semiotic resources, as described in chapters by 
Goldin-Meadow, Levinson, and Goodwin, is caused in great part by the 
presence of a massive inventory of common ground, both cultural and 
personal (Clark 1996). Common ground, or mutual knowledge shared 
by social associates (whether based on common experience or common 
cultural background) provides premises for amplicative inference (Goody 
1995; Levinson 1995). Communication constantly exploits common 
ground, partly to overcome the communication bottleneck entailed by 
the slowness of speech (Levinson 2000). Enfield explores the notion 
that common ground is strategically exploited not only in the service 
of economy of expression, but for affiliative display of social closeness. 
Enfield suggests that because common ground is so crucial to effective 
communication, and to the display of affiliation, people go out of their 
way to augment it, as when a mother points out new things to her child 
yet without obvious or immediate purpose for doing so.
From Individual Interactions via Cognition to Entire Cultural Systems 
(Sperber) The chapters reviewed so far enable us to assemble a range of 
components of human sociality: its observable structures, its cognitive 
underpinnings, its cultural bases, and its role in the coordination of 
human cognition and activity. How are we to think about the link 
between cultural diversity and the presumably universal cognitive 
and ethological foundations of human sociality? A number of authors 
wrestle with this question, especially Gaskins, Levinson, Schegloff, 
and Astington. Sperber's chapter offers us a sustained theoretical pano­
rama. He develops the idea of the Cognitive Causal Chain (CCC), a 
causal sequence that includes at least one cognitive representation. 
A perception is a causal relation between a thing in the world and a 
mental representation; an inference is a causal relation between two
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representations; an action is a causal relation between an intention and 
the behavior that attempts to realize it. In social interaction the output 
of one individual's CCC is the input to another's, and in such cases we 
can talk about social CCCs. Great chains of social CCCs are possible, 
ultimately passing effects across whole populations. When these CCCs 
have the function of preserving either behavioral form or mental 
content or both (as in a song), they become cultural CCCs. This all 
leads toward a model of the distribution of cultural forms and meanings 
as if they were, say, viruses in a population—that is to say, subject to 
the mechanisms of evolution of traits in a population (Enfield 2003, 
2005a; Sperber 1985,1996). This suggests a Darwinian model for cultural 
evolution (Levinson and Jaisson 2006; Richerson and Boyd 2004). The 
relation between cognitive universals, provided by the organism, and 
the variability of cultural forms is simple enough: Cognition provides 
the essential filter on what can be easily transmitted through a CCC. 
To get feedback from CCCs to the cognitive system requires a further 
kind of evolutionary mechanism, which leads us to the chapters in the 
final part, focusing on the phylogeny of human sociality.
Part 5: Evolutionary Perspectives
The chapters in parts 1-4 establish defining properties of human social 
interaction, including sustained coattentional engagement, common 
commitment to cooperative activity, and attribution of communicative 
intentions to others. These properties are not shared by even our closest 
relatives among the apes. What are the critical differences? How could 
they have evolved?
Cooperative Instincts and Group Selection (Boyd and Richerson) The mutual 
commitment characteristic of human interaction (see Clark, Goodwin) 
points to a classic puzzle in evolutionary theory: the riddle of human 
cooperative behavior. Why are people so highly cooperative, when, 
for an individual, it should always pay to take the benefits of others' 
cooperative acts without reciprocating? The answer supplied in Boyd 
and Richerson's chapter is that cooperative behavior is instinctual. (This 
is supported by work presented in a number of other chapters: Gergely 
and Csibra, Liszkowski, and Tomasello report cooperative acts by infants 
of around one year of age.) Boyd and Richerson discuss experimental 
findings that adults, from societies of different kinds around the world, 
do not maximize their own gains but, instead, feel an obligation to share 
hidden benefits (Henrich et al. 2004). If our brand of cooperation is a
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species-specific instinct, we then face the evolutionary puzzles: What 
would have been the selective advantage of cooperative sociality for 
the individual? How did the mechanisms that drive it develop?
Boyd and Richerson argue that group selection provides an account 
for the evolution of human cooperative instincts. Group selection is an 
unusual mechanism for evolutionary change, in which behavior shared 
by a group, rather than by an individual or his or her immediate kin, gives 
the entire group advantages over other groups. Because of its marginal 
status as an evolutionary mechanism, group selection presupposes 
earlier cultural adaptations that would have given sufficient adaptive 
advantage to the group as a whole as well as behaviors that signal and 
maintain boundaries between groups. Thus, the cognitive prerequisites 
for cultural learning (see Byrne, Gergely and Csibra, Tomasello) would 
have been essential for the evolution of cooperative instincts.
Evolution o f  Action Parsing and Intention Attribution (Byrne) Many of 
the chapters in this book detail the structure and nature of interaction, 
showing that humans depend in interaction on the ability to segment 
and interpret complex and sustained sequences of action, to recognize 
routines within them, and to see the intentions behind them. How 
could such skills have developed in our species? Cultural learning clearly 
involves the ability to learn from watching others' behavior. But where 
this behavior is of any complexity, some kind of parsing analysis is 
required. Byrne describes how some groups of gorillas share techniques 
for nettle stripping that are transmitted by cultural learning. He proposes 
that a simple statistical and structural analysis of observed behavior 
allows a novice not only to extract the essentials of the technique (see the 
parallel account for syntactic parsing of speech in Goodwin's chapter), 
but to grasp its goal-oriented nature (cf. Gergely and Csibra's discussion 
of rational imitation). This provides a glimpse into the phylogenetic 
precursors of intention attribution, human imitation, and learning. It 
also has implications for our understanding of intention attribution in 
modern human social interaction.
Like a number of other contributors (see Goodwin, Hutchins, Scheg­
loff), Byrne cautions against overestimating the degree to which people 
explicitly model others' mental states in interaction. The explicit 
mentalism implied by much ToM research can be minimized by 
behavior-based, statistical means for interpretation of others' action.
Pointing, 2—The Phylogenetic Kernel o f  Human Sociality (Tomasello) Several 
contributors discuss the importance of pointing in human interaction.
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Goodwin, for example, describes the critical role of pointing in com­
municating when language is unavailable (see also Goodwin 2003). 
Tomasello's chapter puts the theme in a phylogenetic perspective. He 
starts from the observation that apes, our nearest relatives, not only lack 
language but they do not point or comprehend pointing. (This claim 
has been contested—De Waal 2001; Vea and Sabater-Pi 1998—but as 
Tomasello points out, the reported empirical observations have not been 
replicated; cf. Povinelli et al. 2003.) Although apes do monitor others' 
eye gaze, and seem to understand that others might see what they 
cannot see, they do not seem to grasp the idea that an interactant might 
be trying to get them to shift their attention. Underlying this failure is 
the absence of efforts to establish joint attention, and the absence of 
complex collaborative action. Experiments by Tomasello and colleagues 
show, by contrast, that human infants of 14 months systematically 
distinguish between what an adult has already seen from what is new for 
that adult. Tomasello argues that what distinguishes humans from other 
apes are instincts for helping and sharing, manifest in collaborative 
interactions based on "shared intentionality" (i.e., joint intentions and 
joint attention). These instincts are manifest in the humble pointing 
gesture, which despite being well under control by a one-year-old 
human (see Liszkowski), is never convincingly comprehended by any 
other great ape. It is this gesture, Tomasello submits, that provides a 
foundation for the evolution and acquisition of language, culture, and 
the full richness of human sociality.
Concluding Remarks: Toward a Synthesis
A Framework for Integrating the Different Levels o f  Phenomena in 
the Domain
Here, we propose a synthesis of the ideas aired in this book, to show how 
the contributing concepts, which relate to distinct levels of phenomena, 
fit together to yield an integrated perspective on human sociality. The 
framework helps us see the essential roles different disciplines play in the 
study of this domain, and how they might better inform one another 
in future work. We distinguish three distinct levels of phenomena:
1. Interaction Engine (individual level): The individual brings to 
interaction an "interaction engine," consisting of ToM abilities and 
communicative capacities built on them, biological constraints, and 
ethological proclivities (as outlined in Levinson and in part 2 of this 
book). Crucial elements of this include the ability to recognize others' 
intentions through modeling the minds of others in real contexts
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(and to anticipate their modeling of our anticipation of their intention 
attribution!). These elements together form the essential equipment 
for formulating and interpreting actions in an interactional setting. 
We think it likely that the foundations of the engine are biologically 
endowed, or at least unfold in human development in comparable ways 
given local parallels in interactional organization. But such development 
depends on an interaction matrix, so that the engine may be fine-tuned 
to a local cultural frame.
2. Interaction Matrix (interpersonal level): The "interaction matrix" 
in which the interaction engine is deployed has special and peculiar 
emergent properties, potentially accounting for the universality of 
its inventories of turn-taking systems, repair mechanisms, sequential 
organizations, and the like (issues explored largely in parts 1 & 4). An 
interaction is a sequential, contingent structure in which what hap­
pens next is as much determined by other parties as by oneself. There 
need not be any particular prearranged plan or direction (as in casual 
conversation). As yet, there is no adequate formal theory of this kind of 
contingent interaction with shifting goals (despite game theory being 
able to capture situations in which goals are zero-sum or fully shared). 
The most complex properties of human interaction are emergent. 
Consider a soccer team working together. The overall flow of movement 
of the ball stems from the individual players' movements and local 
intentions, but the entire pattern cannot be coherently reduced to any 
one player's individual intentions, tacit understandings, or actions. 
The emerging pattern depends on actual outcomes, overall sequence 
and timing.
3. Sociocultural Frame (social-cultural level): The interaction matrix 
provides the building blocks of social organization and its constituent 
institutions, which constrain interaction within specific cultural frames 
(focal in part 3). These are the frames in which the business of society is 
conducted, whether they are legal hearings, gossip on the street corner, 
or infant-caretaker settings. Social institutions are often robust, with 
deep histories, and their fortunes are subject to patterns of cultural 
evolution on a time scale different from the ephemeral interactions 
that nevertheless instantiate them. This is the level to which the bulk 
of ethnographic description and analysis has been devoted.
Consequences o f  this Framework
Within this framework, we can restate a number of interesting proposi­
tions arising out of the work summarized in this book. Consider the 
following points.
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On Human Phytogeny A central key to human evolution lies in under­
standing the relation between phenomena of these three different scales 
and ontological types (central issues in part 5). The interaction engine 
is adapted to the interaction matrix, for the engine's function is to 
conduct mentally mediated interaction at the interpersonal level. The 
interaction matrix of our forebears was the selecting environment for the 
biological and ethological roots of the interaction engine—for example 
ToM, or the foundations of language. In turn, the interaction matrix is 
built out of the raw potential that the engine supplies. Limits to, say, 
speed or complexity of communication are inherited from the engine's 
properties. Again, the interaction matrix is adapted to conducting the 
business of higher-order social organizations. Among the properties 
of these higher-order units are those that endowed groups with the 
adaptive cultural edge over other groups, allowing group selection to 
play a role in human evolution.
On Language Language plays a central role in human social life, as 
suggested by its ubiquity, dominance, and elaboration. But the work 
assembled in this book suggests that language itself rests on other 
abilities that are ontogenetically, phylogenetically, and logically prior 
—in particular, the ability to attribute action, meaning, and intention in 
structured sequences of interaction. Communication is possible without 
fully fledged language (as in home-sign systems or in interaction with 
infants), operating on a basis of reflexive or anticipatory intention 
attribution, which is always at work even in the use of languages 
with full expressive power. Thus, the evolutionary basis for language 
must be sought in the mutual adaptation of the interaction engine 
to the interaction matrix, and to the sociocultural level in which it is 
embedded. To be sure, the combination of the interactional engine 
and a full preconventionalized symbolic system like a language yields a 
quantum leap in expressive and computational power in the interactional 
domain. The structured representational system of language also appears 
to retool the ToM (see Astington, Pyers), allowing richer and more 
complex inferences. But in the end, it seems, although language is trans­
formative of our cognitive and interactional powers, it rests on a more 
fundamental cognitive specialization that appears earlier in human 
phylogeny (and ontogeny; see below).
On Cultural Evolution Cultural diversity arises from the relative success 
of particular institutions in local contexts, together with random effects 
like drift (see Sperber). Particular cultural patterning of interaction reflects 
feedback to the interaction matrix from specific forms of organization
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in the sociocultural frame, and then to the local tuning in ontogeny 
of the interaction engines of individuals. For example, in a society like 
Java with social hierarchy and courtly traditions, decorum will specify 
the proper deployment of body position, gesture, and honorific levels 
in language, behavior inculcated during child development.
On Human Ontogeny The phylogenetic and historical perspectives are 
complemented by an ontogenetic perspective. The interaction engine is 
not literally delivered with the infant at birth, although core biological 
and ethological constituents certainly are. The engine has to unfold 
through experience in the interaction matrix, which will cause the 
developing child's interaction engine to inherit cultural specializations. 
Gaskins's catalogue of cultural differences in child rearing suggests, 
however, that the initial ingredients are robust enough to give us 
universal outcomes regardless of experience (as in the cross-cultural 
parallels in Goldin-Meadow's home-signing children). We suggest that 
culture can reach deep down into the details of interaction, but only 
by modulating tendencies that are universal or default.
Conclusion
The kind of synthesis we propose offers a closer integration of the 
contributing research traditions. So psychological approaches will 
benefit from expertise at the level of the interaction matrix. For exam­
ple, work on infant pointing gestures (see Liszkowski, Tomasello) 
should be alert to the sequential contexts in which they occur and 
on which their interpretation may crucially depend. Conversely, work 
on the interaction matrix will be enriched by understanding what is 
(psychologically) under the hood. Observational work on sequences of 
interaction has revealed many kinds of contingencies between actions 
in interaction (e.g., question-answer sequences or greetings), but we do 
not know how some of these implicit classifications (e.g., of an action 
as an X or a Y) are achieved online. We know little about the sources 
and development in infancy of skills in navigating finely temporal 
and contingent interactional sequences such as conversational turn 
taking. Do such skills have an instinctual basis, or are they built during 
development on a more primitive instinctual testing of contingencies 
in the physical world? We know that interactants are highly sensitive 
to others' mental states, but we do not know how these registers of 
information for potential interlocutors are constructed or assessed— 
experimental techniques will be critical here.
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At another level, that of the sociocultural frame, the interaction 
matrix offers insights into how cultural events and processes are 
actually constructed. Slight modifications of a universal generic base 
for conversational organization can yield all sorts of specific speech 
events. For example, restricting interchanges to questions and answers 
can give us a basis for courtroom interrogation or classroom teaching— 
further assigning rights to question, and the role of overhearers, can 
help us distinguish the conduct of the two cultural event types. Tracing 
further back, if we know the psychological or developmental sources of 
those universal tendencies, we might understand universal constraints 
on social organization. Conversely, the analysis of social organization 
can inform the conduct of interaction in myriad ways, helping us 
understand background assumptions operative within specific events, 
the choice of language and social role, and the like.
This raises an apparent tension in this volume between those who 
emphasize the individual's psychological abilities and those who focus 
on the emergent properties of the interaction matrix, or the way in 
which social interaction is adapted to local sociocultural organization. 
We do not regard this as simply border warfare, with rival definitions 
of Durkheim's "psychological" versus "social facts." Rather, it reflects a 
disagreement about the primacy of one or other of the three levels—the 
individual, the interactional, and the sociocultural. When A asks B a 
question, and B answers it, is this because B discerns A's intentions (a 
psychological level of explanation)? Is it because B follows the rules of the 
language game (an interactional level of explanation)? Or is it because 
B recognizes that A is endowed with the social rights and authority to 
ask that kind of question in the current situation (a sociocultural level 
of explanation)? Different researchers rightly test the power of their 
own lines of explanation by pushing the limits, and they are likely to 
favor one or another level of explanation. This area of research is young 
enough that there is no consensus about which level should bear the 
major burden of explanation for specific phenomena. Thus, although 
there are substantive concerns raised in some of the chapters regarding 
the applicability of terms and concepts like "intention," "action," and 
even "cognition," true reduction to just one level or another is not 
going to work: the levels have independent properties but are also 
mutually interdependent. The interpersonally emergent interaction 
matrix would not be possible without the individually seated interaction 
engine, but it is not "generated" by it. The interaction matrix has higher- 
order emergent properties, reflected in the way that local outcomes are 
contingent on the actions and responses of all the players. Likewise,
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although social institutions are realized through interaction, they have 
long-term historical roots and interdependence with other aspects of 
culture that require an independent level of analysis. For these reasons, 
this will remain an interdisciplinary domain of inquiry, requiring input 
from disciplines with insights special to the different levels that make it 
up. And the contributors to this project will need to learn each others' 
languages if we are going to make real progress.
We thus bring to a close our preview of the range of ideas on human 
sociality put forth in the chapters of this book. We hope the volume 
does much to spur cross-border commerce between the different fields. 
If this can be promoted, we believe that the field of social interaction 
research will rightly come to be central in the human sciences, opening 
fundamental insights into what kind of a beast we are, and how we 
came to have our own uniquely complex form of sociality.
Motes
1. The term sociality is used with a narrower meaning than ours by Henrich 
et al. (2004), to refer to cooperative and altruistic instincts, which "deviate 
from an axiom of selfishness." Sussman and Chapman (2004) use the term in 
a related way to this, to refer to the orientation of individuals to group living. 
Given that "group-living individuals must forgo some of their individual 
freedoms in order to socialize within the 'group/ " Sussman and Chapman's 
sense of "sociality" refers to "the compromises that individuals make, the 
mechanisms they use, and the means by which they maintain these social 
groups" (Sussman and Chapman 2004:10). Our sense of sociality includes these 
features among a broader complex of psychological and social predispositions, 
principles of interactional organization, and specific interactional practices.
2. Key references include Premack and Woodruff (1978), Byrne and Whiten 
(1988), Astington et al. (1988), Davies and Stone (1995a, 1995b), Whiten and 
Byrne (1997), and Carruthers and Smith (1996), among many others.
3. Our use of the term Theory o f  Mind refers more generally to the full 
ensemble of "mind-reading" skills of which false-belief understanding is a 
single and late-developing component.
4. Key references include Sacks (1992), Sudnow (1972), Sacks et al. (1974), 
Goodwin (1981), Atkinson and Heritage (1984), Button and Lee (1987), 
Schegloff (in press), among many others.
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5. Interaction analysts have also invested effort in understanding the use 
of gesture, gaze, and body position in social interaction (Goodwin 1981; 
Schegloff 1984; see also Goodwin, Hutchins). (Psychologists, too, have been 
especially interested in gesture; see Goldin-Meadow, Liszkowski, Tomasello.) 
These studies underline the multimodal nature of human communication. 
Again, there are clear universal tendencies here. For example, in all cultures, 
as far as we know, people gesture when they talk, although the exact nature of 
gesture, gaze, and body position are very much culturally constrained.
References
Astington, J. W., P. L. Harris, and D. R. Olson (eds.). 1988. Developing 
Theories o f  Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Atkinson, J. M., and J. Heritage (eds.). 1984. Structures o f  social action: 
Studies in conversation analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Baron-Cohen, S. 1995. Mindblindness: An essay on autism and Theory o f  
Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Boyd, R., and P. J. Richerson. 2005. The origin and evolution o f  cultures.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Boyer, P. 1994. The naturalness o f  religious ideas: A cognitive theory o f  
religion. Berkeley: University of California Press.
------. 2002. Religion explained: The human instincts that fashion gods,
spirits, and ancestors. London: Vintage.
Button, G., and J. R. E. Lee (eds.). 1987. Talk and social organization.
Clevedon, UK: Multilingual Matters.
Byrne, R. W., and A. Whiten (eds.). 1988. Machiavellian intelligence: Social 
expertise and the evolution o f  intellect in monkeys, apes, and humans. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Carruthers, P., and P. K. Smith (eds.). 1996. Theories o f  Theories o f  Mind.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Clark, H. 1996. Using language. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Davies, M., and T. Stone (eds.). 1995a. Folk psychology. Oxford: 
Blackwell.
------, (eds.). 1995b. Mental simulation. Oxford: Blackwell.
De Waal, F. 2001. Pointing primates: Sharing knowledge without 
language. Chronicle o f  Higher Education, January 19: B7-B9.
Dunbar, R., C. Knight, and C. Power (eds.). 1999. The evolution o f  culture.
New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
Duranti, A. (ed.). 2001. Linguistic anthropology: A reader. Malden, MA: 
Blackwell.
Introduction 33
Enfield, N. J. 2000. The theory of cultural logic: How individuals 
combine social intelligence with semiotics to create and maintain 
cultural meaning. Cultural Dynamics 12(l):35-64.
------. 2003. Linguistic epidemiology: Semantics and grammar o f  language
contact in mainland Southeast Asia. London: Routledge.
------. 2005a. Areal linguistics and mainland Southeast Asia. Annual
Review o f  Anthropology 34:181-206.
------. 2005b. The body as a cognitive artifact in kinship representations:
Hand gesture diagrams by speakers of Lao. Current Anthropology 
41(6):51-81.
Enfield, N.J., and Stivers, T. (eds.). in press. Person reference in interaction: 
Linguistic, cultural, and social perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Geertz, C. 1973. The interpretation o f  cultures. New York: Basic Books.
Gergely, G., Bekkering, H., and Kiraly, I. 2002. Rational imitation in 
preverbal infants. Nature, 415(6873):755.
Goffman, E. 1963. Behaviour in public places: Notes on the social organization 
o f  gatherings. New York: Free Press.
------. 1964. The neglected situation. American Anthropologist 66(6):133-
36.
------. 1974. Frame analysis: An essay on the organization o f  experience.
Boston: Northeastern University Press.
------. 1981. Forms o f  talk. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press.
Goodwin, C. 1981. Interactional organization: Interaction between speakers 
and hearers. New York: Academic Press.
------. 1994. Professional vision. American Anthropologist 96(3):606-
633.
------. 2000. Action and embodiment within situated human interaction.
Journal o f  Pragmatics 32:1489-1522.
------. 2003. Pointing as situated practice. In Pointing: Where language,
culture, and cognition meet, edited by S. Kita, 217-242. Mahwah, NJ: 
Erlbaum.
Goody, E. N. (ed.). 1995. Social intelligence and interaction: Expressions 
and implications o f  the social bias in human intelligence. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Grice, H. P. 1957. Meaning. Philosophical Review 67:377-388.
------. 1975. Logic and conversation. In Speech Acts, edited by P. Cole
and J. L. Morgan, 41-58. New York: Academic Press.
Gumperz, J. J. 1982. Discourse strategies. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni­
versity Press.
34 Introduction
Gumperz , J  .J., andD. Hymes (eds.). 1986[1972]. Directions in sociolinguistics: 
The ethnography o f  communication. London: Blackwell.
Henrich, J., R. Boyd, S. Bowles, C. Camerer, E. Fehr, and H. Gintis 
(eds.). 2004. Foundations o f  human sociality: Economic experiments and 
ethnographic evidence from fifteen small-scale societies. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Hutchins, E. 1995. Cognition in the wild. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Hymes, D. H. (ed.). 1964. Language in culture and society: A reader in 
linguistics and anthropology. New York: Harper and Row.
Kockelman, P. 2005. The semiotic stance. Semiotica 157(l-4):233- 
304.
Levinson, S. C. 1995. Interactional biases in human thinking. In Social 
intelligence and interaction: Expressions and implications o f  the social 
bias in human intelligence, edited by E. Goody, 221-260. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
------. 2000. Presumptive meanings. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Levinson, S. C., and P. Jaisson (eds.). 2006. Evolution and culture. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Norman, D. A. 1991. Cognitive Artifacts. In Designing interaction: 
Psychology at the human-computer interface, edited by J. M. Carroll, 
17-38. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Povinelli, D. J., J. M. Bering, and S. Giambrone. 2003. Chimpanzees' 
"pointing": Another error of the argument by analogy? In Pointing: 
Where language, culture, and cognition meet, edited by S. Kita, 35-68. 
Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Premack, D., and G. Woodruff. 1978. Does the chimpanzee have a 
Theory of Mind? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1:515-526.
Richerson, P. J., and R. Boyd. 2004. Not by genes alone: How culture 
transformed human evolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Sacks, H. 1992. Lectures on Conversation. London: Blackwell.
Sacks, H., and E. A. Schegloff. 1979. Two preferences in the organization 
of reference to persons in conversation and their interaction. In 
Everyday language: Studies in ethnomethodology, edited by G. Psathas, 
15-21. New York: Irvington.
Sacks, H., E. A. Schegloff, and G. Jefferson. 1974. A simplest systematics 
for the organization of turn-taking for conversation. Language 
50(4):696-735.
Schegloff, E. A. 1984. On some gestures' relation to talk. In Structures o f  
social action: Studies in conversation analysis, edited b y j. M. Atkinson 
and J. Heritage, 266-296. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
------. 1992. Repair after next turn: The last structurally provided defense
Introduction 35
of intersubjectivity in conversation. American Journal o f  Sociology 
97(5):1295-1345.
------. in press. Sequence organization in interaction: A primer in conversation
analysis, 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Schegloff, E. A., G. Jefferson, and H. Sacks. 1977. The preference for 
self-correction in the organization of repair in conversation. Language 
53(2):361-382.
Schieffelin, B. B., and E. Ochs (eds.). 1986. Language socialization across 
cultures. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Shore, B. 1998. Culture in mind: Cognition, culture, and the problem o f  
meaning. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sidnell, J. 2001. Conversational turn-taking in a Caribbean English 
Creole. Journal o f  Pragmatics 33(8): 1263-1290.
------. 2005. Talk and practical epistemology: The social life o f  knowledge in
a Caribbean community. Amsterdam: Benjamins.
Sperber, D. 1985. Anthropology and Psychology—Towards an epidemi­
ology of representations. Man (n.s.) 20(1):73-89.
------. 1996. Explaining culture. A naturalistic approach. Oxford:
Blackwell.
Sperber, D., and D. Wilson. 1986. Relevance: Communication and cognition. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Sudnow, D. (ed.). 1972. Studies in social interaction. New York: Free 
Press.
Sussman, R. W., and A. R. Chapman. 2004. The nature and evolution 
of sociality: Introduction. In The origins and nature o f  sociality, edited 
by R. W. Sussman and A. R. Chapman, 3-22. New York: Aldine de 
Gruyter.
Tomasello, M., M. Carpenter, J. Call, T. Behne, and H. Moll. 2005. Under­
standing and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition. 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28:675-735.
Vea, J., and J. Sabater-Pi. 1998. Spontaneous pointing behaviour in the 
wild Pygmy Chimpanzee (Pan paniscus). Folia Primatologica 69:289- 
290.
Whiten, A., and R. W. Byrne (eds.). 1997. Machiavellian intelligence II: 
Extensions and evaluations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Zeitlyn, D. 1995. Divination as dialogue: Negotiation of meaning with 
random responses. In Social intelligence and interaction: Expressions 
and implications o f  the social bias in human intelligence, edited by E. N. 
Goody, 189-205. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
